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Abstract 
Shihāb al- Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1194), in his most important 
book, Hikmat al-Ishrāq, claims that he has simplified the 
Aristotelian theory of syllogisms by reducing its many rules to a 
few by which the validity of all moods can be proven. This is 
done by reducing all negative and particular categorical 
propositions to universal affirmative propositions and 
introducing two meta-language rules, one for the second and the 
other for the third figure. This is an exposition of the non-modal 
part of his syllogism and an examination of his claim to 
simplifying the Aristotelian theory of syllogism. 
key terms: Shihāb al- Dīn al-Suhrawardī, Hikmat al-Ishrāq, 
Aristotelian logic, theory of  non-modal syllogism, conversion.  
 
Introduction 
A syllogism is a sequence of three propositions all in subject-predicate 
form. The first two propositions are called the premises and the third 
one the conclusion. Each of the subjects and predicates is called a 
term and each syllogism has three terms. The term common to the 
both premises is called the middle term. The term that is the subject of 
the conclusion is the minor term and the term that is the predicate of 
the conclusion is the major term. The premise containing the major 
term is called the major premise and the one containing the minor 
term the minor premise. In the traditional Islamic texts on logic, the 
minor premise comes before the major premise, which is the converse 
of their order in traditional European texts on logic. 
                                                 
∗
 Professor at the Iranian Institute of Philosophy.             Email:szia110@yahoo.com 
  
 
6 Sophia Perennis, Vol. 2, Number 4, Autumn  2010 
 
     Syllogisms are classified according to the position of the middle 
term in the premises. Let us fix 'F' and 'H' as the subject and predicate 
of the conclusion, and 'G' as the middle term. This gives us the 
following possible permutations of the three terms. Each pattern of 
permutations is called a figure: 
 
 
                          1        2 3 4 
  Minor premise: F, G F, G G, F G,F                                                                        
: Major premise:     G, H H, G G, H H, G  
   Conclusion:  F, H F, H F, H F, H 
Given that each premise can be one of the four categorical 
propositions, i.e.,  universal affirmative, universal negative, particular 
affirmative, and particular negative proposition, each figure can have 
16 patterns, not all of which are valid. Thus, we need some principles 
to distinguish the valid patterns (moods) from the invalid ones in each 
figure. There are different ways of doing that. The most important 
way which makes the theory of syllogism looks like a deductive 
theory is to give some rules, take one mood as axiom, and show the 
validity of certain other patterns by reducing them to that mood. This 
is the method the Peripatetic logicians used for the theory of the 
syllogism. 
 
     Suhrawardi, following Farabi and Ibn Sina, discards the fourth 
figure, as it is not intuitively plausible (4, p.34). 
 
Suhrawardi's theory of the syllogism 
Suhrawardī's main claim is that all propositions can be reduced to 
necessary universal affirmative propositions. So he writes:  
 
The mode of the relation of the predicate to 
the subject of a categorical proposition is 
either 'necessary', which is called 'wajeb' 
['necessary'], or 'necessary not', which is 
called 'impossible', or 'not necessary' and 'not 
necessary not' which is called 'possible.' (4, p. 
27, all translations from Corbin's edition are 
mine.) 
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     Then by making modality a part of predicate and changing every 
existential proposition to universal one, he claims that the proposition 
if true becomes necessarily true with modality De dicto. 
 So his logic is fundamentally modal.  But in this paper I am only 
interested in the non-modal part of his logic. I leave his modal claim, 
which is more complicated and controversial to another paper. 
 
      Suhrawardī's way of proving the validity of all moods of 
syllogisms is based on the following methods: 
 
1. Reducing all negative categorical propositions to affirmatives by 
obversion of their predicates: 
Thus, 
Some A is not a B    
becomes 
Some A is a non-B. 
Similarly, 
No A is a B 
becomes 
 Every A is a non-B. 
  
2. Reducing all particular categorical propositions to universals by 
defining a new predicate like "D" for those individuals to which 
"some A" in "Some A is B" is referring (ecthesis). 
Thus,  
Some A is a B 
changes to 
Every D is a B. 
So by the first principle, 
Some A is not a B 
becomes, 
Every D is a non-B. 
 
3. Two rules, one for the second and one for the third figure, as 
discussed below. 
 
Now let us examine the three figures. 
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First figure 
By applying the first and second method (obversion and ecthesis) to 
all moods of the first figure but Barbara, they are easily reduced to 
Barbara. For example, the syllogism: 
Some animals are rational beings 
No rational being is a stone 
Some animals are not stones  
 
is reduced to:  
Every D is a rational being 
Every rational being is a non-stone 
Every D is a non-stone  
     The result is a Barbara syllogism, and the conclusion can easily be 
rewritten as: 
Some animals are not stones  
     The other two moods in this figure are reduced in the same way to 
Barbara.  
Now let us examine the other figures. 
 
Second figure 
According to the traditional texts, the valid moods of the second figure 
have the following four forms:  
 
1-Every F is a G                               
No H is a G                                                              
No F is an H 
                                  
2- No H is a G 
Every F is a G   
No H is an F 
                                  
3- Some F is a G 
No H is a G 
Some F is not an H 
 
4- Some H is not a G 
        Every F is a G 
Some H is not an F 
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     Now by using Suhrawardī's principles we get the following 
universal affirmative forms corresponding to each mood written 
above: 
 
 
1'- Every F is a G 
Every H is a non-G 
Every F is a non-H 
 
2'-Every H is a non-G 
Every F is a G 
Every H is a non-F 
 
3'- Every D is a G 
Every H is a non-G 
Every D is a non-H 
 
4'- Every D is a non-G 
Every F is a G 
Every D is a non-F 
 
      As it is clearly seen in this formalism, all these moods have only 
one form. We have two different subjects, to one of which a predicate 
is applied and to the other the negated or obverse of that predicate is 
applied. In order to prove the validity of this form, he introduces here 
a new principle at the meta-language level: 
If there are two [affirmative] universal (mohitatan) 
propositions with different subjects such that a 
predicate is applied to one of them, and it would be 
impossible to apply the same predicate to the other in 
all aspects or one aspect…then it is impossible to 
describe one of the subjects in terms of the other no 
matter which one of them would be taken as the 
subject or the predicate of the conclusion [of those 
two subjects] (4, P.36.)                                     
     By using this rule, the validity of the moods of this figure is 
secured, though not by reducing them to Barbara. 
      In the Aristotelian tradition, Suhrawardī's common form of this 
figure is written as 
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Every F is a G 
Every H is a non-G 
No F is an H 
But to get this conclusion the second premise is converted to: 
Every G is a non-H 
Now from this and the first premise we get: 
Every F is a non-H 
      This is a Barbara syllogism. Suhrawardī unwilling to use 
conversion applies his rule as follows: 
 
These two statements are two propositions that are 
impossible to predicate to the subject of one of them 
what is predicated to the subject of the other. Every 
two propositions that are impossible to predicate to the 
subject of one of them what is predicated to the subject 
of the other then their subjects are necessarily 
incompatible. 
 Therefore the subjects of these two statements are 
necessarily incompatible. (4, P.37) 
 
     At the beginning of this meta-language Barbara syllogism he 
writes: “Wa makhrajahoo men al-shikl al-awwal" (3, p.39), meaning 
"And its derivation is from the first figure." He then writes his 
derivation mentioned above. The subtle point here is that Suhrawardi's 
rule is, in modern terms, a meta-language rule, while the conversion 
used by traditional logicians is a rule whose legitimacy is proven 
within the object language.  
     It should be mentioned in passing that J. Walbridge and H.Ziai's 
translation of this part (5, p.23) of Hekmat al- Ishrāq seems to be 
erroneous, as is the translation of the corresponding part in the third 
figure (5, p. 25).                                                                                                                    
     It is worth mentioning that in this figure, like other figures, 
Suhrawardī extends his discussion to modal syllogisms as well. 
However, as I said before, I have set this part of his theory aside. He 
believes, as Ibn Sina did before him, that every proposition is modal 
whether its modality is enunciated or not. This is a position that even 
some contemporary modal logicians hold. But my purpose in this 
paper is to find out whether Suhravardī’s claims concerning the non-
 11     Suhrawardi on Syllogisms 
 
modal part of his logic, the much simpler part, is tenable. This would 
prepare the ground for examining his more ambitious claim. 
 
Third figure  
Suhrawardī’s treatment of the third figure is more interesting. He 
begins with two singular propositions: 
Zaid is a human being  
Zaid is an animal 
Now he says from these two premises we can get:  
Some human beings are animals  
and  Some animals are human beings  
     Then he adds that if instead of a certain individual we have a term 
with a general meaning like "human being," we can generalize (of 
course, only in some cases) our premises to obtain: 
Every human being is an animal 
Every human being is a rational being 
     Here again, as in the case in the second figure, he introduces 
another meta-language principle: 
If a certain thing [here 'human being'] is described 
by two descriptions, then an individual [referred 
to by 'human being' here] described by one of 
them is to be described by the other.  
(4, pp.37-38) 
He then concludes: 
Some animals are rational beings  
 
     The subtle part of his discussion on this figure is when one of the 
premises is a particular categorical one: 
Every human being is an animal 
Some human beings are writers  
     Here he says that since some human beings are included in every 
human being, it would be enough to select something described by 
both predicates.  
     The reader familiar with natural deduction rules realizes that 
Suhrawardi is implicitly using some rules like existential elimination, 
introduction rules, as well as the universal elimination rule. Also in his 
discussion of all moods, the non-emptiness of the subject terms is 
presupposed. To see how, the general pattern of his argument can be 
formulated as the following valid argument in modern predicate logic: 
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(x)(Fx→Gx) 
(x)(Fx→Hx) 
( x)Fx 
( x)(Gx&Hx) 
 
     Again at the end of his discussion of this figure he formulates the 
application of his rule to the common pattern of this figure in the form of 
Barbara. He calls this "its derivation from the first figure:” 
                                     
These two statements are two propositions in which a 
certain thing is described by two predicates. In every 
two propositions in which a certain thing is described 
by two predicates, then something described  by one of 
the predicates is described by the other.  
So these two statements are such that some of the 
individual described by one of the predicates is 
described by the other predicate. (4, p.39) 
 
Suhrawardī here again uses a meta-language rule to prove the validity 
of the moods. 
     Of course any axiom, law or principle of any science can be used 
in or applied to a particular case and be formulated in the form of 
Barbara. Look at this argument: 
 
The straight line L is passing through two points a and 
b 
A straight line passing through two points is the 
shortest distance between them 
Therefore,  L is the shortest distance between a and b 
 
     Suhrawardī also formulates the application of each rule in the form 
of modes ponens. 
 
     Suhrawardī's discussion of the third syllogism involves some other 
new points too. So let us examine it more carefully. 
     Traditionally, the third figure has six moods as follows (respecting 
the Islamic logic texts, again I write the minor premise before the 
major and use modern symbolism): 
1- (x)(Gx→Fx) 
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(x)(Gx→Hx) 
(Ex)(Fx&Hx) 
                             
2-(x)(Gx→ Fx) 
(x)(Gx→⌐Hx) 
(Ex)(Fx&⌐Hx) 
                                  
3- (Ex)(Gx&Hx) 
(x)(Gx→Fx) 
(Ex)(Hx&Fx) 
                                    
4- (Ex)(Gx&Hx) 
(x)(Gx→⌐Fx) 
(Ex)(Hx&⌐Fx) 
 
5- (x)(Gx→Fx) 
(Ex)(Gx&Hx) 
(Ex)(Fx&Hx) 
 
6- (x)(Gx →Fx) 
(Ex)(Gx&⌐Hx) 
(Ex)(Fx&⌐Hx) 
 
     Here, in mood (2), by making the negation a part of 'H' in the 
second premise (obversion), it is reduced to the first mood. Then, by 
applying Suhrawardī's second meta-language rule, the conclusion 
follows. As for the other four moods, it is enough to consider one of 
them. Let us consider mood (6). 
     By ecthesis and obversion, the second premise becomes: 
                                        
(x)(Dx→non-Hx) 
Given that the objects referred to by 'Ex' of the second premise are 
included in '(x)' of the first premise we have: 
 
(x)(Dx→Gx) 
 
From this and the first premise we have the following premises: 
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(x)(Dx→ Fx) 
(x)(Dx→ non-Hx) 
 
And again by applying the same rule we get: 
 
(Ex)(Fx&non-Hx) 
 
And again by ecthesis it can be written as a universal affirmative 
proposition. 
 
Two more moods 
According to traditional logicians, from two negative propositions and 
two particulars, no valid syllogisms can be obtained. But Suhrawardī 
thinks differently. Let us see how. 
Suppose we have: 
  
No A is a B 
No A is a C 
By obversion he gets: 
Every A is a non-B 
Every A is a non-C  
And by his rule: 
Some non-B is a non-C 
 
     Of course this is a valid pattern but what he does not take into 
account is that he changes the minor and major terms of the premises. 
This is not a counter example to the traditional general rule for 
conversion. In that rule the major and minor remain and should remain 
intact but here 'A' and 'B' are changed to 'non-A' and 'non-B'.  
 
Syllogism with particular premises 
One of the general rules for a valid syllogism is that it should not have 
more than one particular premise. Here Suhrawardi writes: 
  
If some thing is described by one of the two predicates 
or by both of them and specified and made universal, 
then its case will be the same [as general form of the 
third figure.] (4, 38) 
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     Here Suhrawardī seems to be saying that from two particular 
propositions such as: 
                            
Some G is a F 
Some G is an H 
 
One can derive,   
Some F is an H 
     provided something can be specified having both F and H. But 
what is 'that something' supposed to be? Is it an individual like Zaid in 
his first example above? Or by ecthesis is it a predicate like 'D' with 
an extension containing those individuals referred to by 'Some G' in 
the two premises mentioned above? What about the following two 
premises: 
  
Some numbers are evens 
Some numbers are odds 
 
     There is no doubt that Suhrawardī's way of treating this pattern of 
syllogism as valid is a logical mistake. In fact Shahrazūrī in his 
commentary on Hekmat al-Isrāq does not comment on this part, and 
in a section preceding this pattern proves the invalidity of this 
syllogism through two examples (2, p.111). But Qutb-al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 
the other famous commentator of the book, seems to accept the 
validity of the pattern and gives as an example the following premises 
without giving the conclusion or commenting on it: 
Some human beings are actually writers 
Some human beings are actually laughers 
(1, p.214) 
 
     It seems that the commentator, by adding 'actually' to each 
proposition, tries to make sure that there are actually some writers and 
some laughers and consequently some laughing writers! Of course if, 
as Suhrawardī says, one could find in such pattern an individual 
described by both predicates 'F' and 'H,’ then one can conclude that 
'Some F is a G.' However, by this kind of extra logical specification 
one can find true examples for any invalid syllogism. In fact this is 
one of the ways our traditional logicians use to prove the invalidities 
of some syllogisms.  
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Discussion 
Let us compare the traditional logicians' treatment of syllogisms with 
that of Suhrawardī’s. Traditional logicians, following Aristotle, take 
the moods of the first figure as self evident and reduce the moods of 
the second and the third figures by conversion, ecthesis and reductio 
ad absurdum to the moods of the first figure, mostly Barbara, to prove 
their validities. 
     Suhrawardī first reduces all premises of the syllogisms to universal 
affirmative categorical propositions by obversion and ecthesis. He 
also accepts Barbara as a self evident syllogism. As to the figures: 
1. All moods of the first figure but Barbara are reduced to Barbara and 
their validities are secured by Barbara. 
2. All the premises of the moods of the second figure will find, in 
modern symbolism, the following common pattern: 
  
(x)(Fx→Gx) 
(x)(Hx→non-Gx) 
 
     Then he applies a new rule at the meta-language level to get the 
conclusion: 
(Ex)(Fx&non-Hx)  
In modern predicate logic, it is enough to add to the premises the non-
emptiness of 'F' (or 'H') as: 
(Ex)Fx (or (Ex)Hx) 
     This shows the soundness of the Suhrawardī's rule. Of course, 
Suhrawardī presupposes the non-emptiness of the subject terms even 
for the negative categorical propositions. 
     Suhrawardī, at the end of his discussion of this figure, formulates 
the application of his rule to the common pattern of the figure, as I 
enunciated above, in the form of Barbara. Of course, as I explained, 
this is not the reduction of the common pattern to Barbara. 
3. Suhrawardi's common form for the moods of the third figure is the 
following:  
(x)(Gx→Fx) 
(x)(Gx→Hx) 
Here again he introduces another rule to get: 
(Ex)(Fx&Hx) 
Again, if we add the existential proposition: 
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(Ex)Gx 
to the premises, the legitimacy of the rule can be verified. 
As I mentioned before, Suhrawardī's proof of this syllogism is 
very similar to quantifier rules of modern natural deduction. 
 
Improvement on Suhrawardī's method 
From what I have said at the end of the second figure above, it seems 
obvious that by applying a simple conversion to the single pattern of 
the second and the single pattern of the third figure, each pattern is 
reduced to Barbara. Thus, not only do we not need Suhrawardī's two 
new rules, but the theory becomes more elegant. Reducing all moods 
to Barbara in this way is more coherent and economical. I wonder 
why Suhrawardī did not choose this much simpler approach in doing 
syllogism.In my forthcoming paper on conversion I show that 
Suhrawardi had good reason to reject this rule. 
 
Conclusion 
From this exposition of Suhrawardī's treatment of the theory of 
syllogism, it seems that: 
1. Suhrawardī's approach to the theory of syllogism and his 
method of proving validity of the moods are formally correct. 
2. According to the textual evidence available to us, all materials 
used by Suhrawardī for forming his theory, including his meta-
language rules, were known to Ibn Sina but scattered here and 
there in his writings and writings of his followers. Suhrawardī 
was the one who gathered them, combined bits and pieces 
together, and made a theory out of them. (Al-Qiyas, second 
part, 4
th
 chapter). 
3. Suhrawardī's version of syllogism can be more simplifieded by 
using simple conversion instead of adding two new rules to the 
traditional theory of syllogism. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Suhrawardī calls his two rules 
illuminationist rules. 
 
     I would like to express my thanks to Professor Wilfrid Hodges for 
his instructive comments on the first draft of this paper. I also wish to 
thank my colleagues Dr.Hossein Massomi Hamadani, Dr.Mahmood 
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Yousefsani and Dr.Seyed N.Mousavian for reading an early draft of 
the paper and making valuable suggestions. 
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